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Introduction
The notion that "the punishment must fit the crime" which derives from the theory of retributive justice is common to most cultures throughout the world. It purports that penalty for a crime should be reasonable and proportionate to the severity of the crime, where proportionality implies the penalty be scaled according to the magnitude of the crime. However, the appropriateness of a penalty for a given crime may vary greatly between cultures and individuals. It is noteworthy that although retributive philosophy supports scaling of punishment according to the severity of a crime, it does not indicate how harsh or soft the punishment should be for any given level of crime. In addition, a recent extension of the philosophy by Davis (1993) indicates the amount of punishment must be proportionate to the amount of unfair advantage gained by the miscreant but not the harm caused by the offence which was hitherto used.
In most parts of the developed world where the retributive philosophy is employed, penalties are graduated or follow a set tariff limiting the discretionary powers of the judiciary. It has been argued that limiting the discretionary powers could lead to unjust punishment under certain circumstances, such as cases that required imposition of fines which do not regard the financial position of an offender. Thus an equal amount of fine for the same infraction e.g. littering could hurt a poor farmer more than a millionaire banker. In contrast, however, a number of former British colonies of sub-Sahara Africa including Ghana have adopted the common law which grants enormous discretion to a judge in criminal cases. In the absence of sentencing guidelines, when assigning penalty for a crime, judges may rely on factors such as the facts of the case including the nature of victimization, subjective principles of sentencing, relative weights of aggravation and mitigation factors, views on crime and punishment, public opinion, as well as demographics like social class of the offender (Ashworth, 2010) . Since these covariates are generally subjective and discretionary, the obvious question is whether the latter system guarantees fairness in redistributive justice or breeds legal or illegal corruption. Specifically, does the severity of punishment per unit of a crime depend on the extent of the crime or not? We investigate this phenomenon by using natural experimental data on prosecuted theft cases in Ghana, a typical sub-Sahara African country, where socio-economic forces are believed to influence assignment of penalties.
According to reports by transparency international the judicial system of sub-Sahara African (SSA) countries is generally perceived to be corrupt with a perceived average corruption index of 3.5 on a scale of 1-5, where 1 is not at all corrupt and 5 implies extremely corrupt (Riaño, et al., 2010) . The respective scores for Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa are 3.7, 3.2 and 2.9. The corresponding rates for the USA and UK are 3.1 and 2.1 respectively. This not-so-good performance of Ghana is partly attributed to the wide range of discretion that judges have over penalty assignment at conviction, which makes it possible for them to favor individuals who steal more. In addition, it is perceived that judges accept bribes to subvert justice by freeing wealthy wrongdoers.
In November 2007, the Chief Justice reacting to a research report on Corruption Monitoring Exercise in Ghana prepared by Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII) conceded that the phenomenon of judicial corruption was not a perception but real (Ghana News Agency, 2007) . In October 2010, the Vice President of the Ghana Bar Association called on the Chief Justice and the Council to eliminate inconsistency, corruption and misconduct by judges (Ghana News Agency, 2007) .
Shortly after that, in April 2011, a judge came under attack as corrupt after acquitting fourteen defendants in a high profile murder trial. In July 2011, four lawyers, including the Executive 6 Secretary of the Constitutional Review Commission, made allegations of widespread corruption among judges; and another lawyer openly confessed to having bribed a judge (Ghana Business News, 2011). Furthermore, in September 2011, two magistrates were sacked for demanding bribes.
We hypothesize that if judges indeed grant such favors at conviction, then the punishment per unit of the crime must decrease with total amount stolen. Two techniques are employed to achieve our objectives: First, an index, similar to Suits index, is employed to verify the extent to which the cumulated punishment increases with cumulated amount stolen; and secondly, a regression analysis is employed to verify the determinants of penalty assigned per unit of the crime or amount stolen (i.e., the price per unit of the crime). We used data meticulously collected on theft and robbery cases convicted in Ghana over a period of six years (2005 to 2010) . Interestingly, the data strongly suggests among other things that penalties assigned for theft cases are extremely anti-petty theft (i.e., judges punish petty thieves disproportionately). Moreover individuals who stole more were found to belong to the higher echelon of the social strata and the petty thieves belonged to the extreme lower end of the social scale.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Penalty Index followed by the regression analysis in section 3. The last section, i.e., Section 4, concludes the paper.
The Penalty Index
To verify whether punishments assigned for varying levels of stealing is anti-serious crime, crime neutral, or anti-petty crime, a variant of the Suits Index (Suits, 1977) is employed. The index, which 7 was originally developed to determine whether a given tax structure is progressive or not, is a summary measure and comes handy in addressing this problem. The index is based on Lorenz Curve which plots cumulative percent of total family income on the vertical axis against the cumulative percent of families on the horizontal axis. Fig. 1 
Note that n is the number of observations and i is individual identifier. The use of this method requires ranking of the data based on values of z . (a) conceals, injures, alters or falsifies a book, or an account kept by or belonging or entrusted to the employers or to the partnership, company or corporation; or entrusted to the officer, or to which the officer has access, as an officer or omits to make a full and true entry in an account of anything which the officer is bound to enter in the account; or (b) publishes an account, a statement or prospectus, relating to the affairs of the partnership, company or corporation, which the officer knows to be false in a material particular The negative value (close to -1) indicates severe anti-petty theft. Consequently, for theft cases in Ghana, the judiciary assign heavier penalty to petty theft relative to serious theft. According to the data, the least amount stolen was GHS 0.35 (US$0.23) and this attracted a jail term of 24 months;
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while the maximum amount of GHS 2,202,111.00 received a total jail term of 57 months. From the data, five individuals who received the lowest penalties included a businessman, a former minister of state, a pastor, a banker and a branch manager of a bank. These are elites in the Ghanaian society.
It is noteworthy that pastors in Ghana do not disclose their wealth and are perceived to be rich with some having net worth in millions of US dollars 2 . The average penalty these elites received is 0.0007 of a month (i.e., 30 minutes) for each GHS1.00 stolen. Their four counterparts (made up of 2 farmers, a laborer and a teacher) who stole the least amounts received 16.5 months per GHS1.00
stolen. To further investigate factors influencing punishment per unit of the theft cases a regression analysis was done.
Empirical estimation of conviction
To empirically investigate the relationship between non-monetary penalties (i.e., jail time) per unit of Ghana Cedi (GHS) equivalent stolen and total amount stolen, two important variables are controlled for. First, we hypothesize that spatial differences exist in the assignment of penalties.
Second, following the statutory classification of theft cases in Ghana, we treat robbery as a different The specific variables considered were the cash value of items stolen or amount stolen, the penalty (i.e., the length of jail time), the nature of the theft (i.e., whether it is robbery or otherwise), the age of the criminal and the region within which the prosecution took place. Due to poor record on criminals, there was very limited information on recidivism. Also the data on age and occupation of the criminal was scanty and therefore could not be used in the empirical analysis. In order to compare the monetary values across the three years, all values were adjusted using the consumer price index. The descriptive statistics of the data is presented in Table 2 . Source: Data extracted from Ghanaweb.com (http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/crime/)
From Table 2 , the total number of usable cases obtained was 118. Although the sample size is quite small, the cases reported on the website were purely random. Moreover, in Ghana, less than 15 5% of criminal cases receive conviction (Ghana Police Service, 2008) . Of the 118 cases, only 8 percent of the theft cases are robbery. Out of the 10 regions in Ghana, 28 percent of the cases prosecuted were in the Ashanti Region, which has 17.3 percent of the nation's population. Fig. 4 presents the plot of the relationship between jail time per unit of the amount stolen and total amount stolen. Fig. 4 depicts a log-linear and inverse relationship between total amount stolen and time served in jail for each GHS stolen. Thus, the total jail time assigned increases nonlinearly and falls as the total amount stolen exceeds a threshold. Indeed the criminal who suffered most was the one who stole the least amount and the one who gained most was the one who stole the highest amount.
The results of the estimated empirical model are presented in Table 3 . The R-squared indicates over 90 percent of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the explanatory variables. The near perfect fit of the regression line supports the finding that members of the same bench determining a sentence at separate location without consulting colleagues were likely to assign similar penalties than would have been expected by chance (Hood, 1972 ). However, a given level of theft may have been committed under different aggravating and mitigating circumstances indicating if the judges consider all the ingredients of cases, penalties for a given level of theft could have varied significantly generating a relatively lower R-squared than obtained. Thus, the extremely high R-squared reflects the fact that sentencing were not based on the traditional view of retributive justice, i.e., the harm caused by the crime.
Further diagnostic tests show the estimated error term from the regression is not heteroskedastic. All the explanatory variables are statistically significant at 99 percent confidence level. The coefficient of amount stolen is negative with elasticity coefficient of -0.8 indicating that, on the average, the jail term per GHS decreases e.g. by 8% if the amount stolen increases by 10%, all else being equal. Clearly, this indicates that criminals who stole more are significantly favored by judges in Ghana. A possible reason for the favorable sentencing received by those who steal more is their ability to afford a better counsel at trial. However, looking at the fit of the regression line, this is possible only if the quality of the legal counsel representing the thief perfectly correlates with the amount stolen, which is doubtful.
Furthermore, robbery cases receive 16 percent more jail time per GHS, on the average, relative to other forms of stealing and criminals convicted in Ashanti region receive 18 percent higher jail time than other regions. This finding stems from the fact that the criminal code considers robbery a much more serious crime than other types of stealing. (US$77Million), which is equivalent to per capita income of over 53,000 individuals within the country. The implication is that, high discretionary powers to judges could potentially result in high blue and white color crimes. It is paramount the legislature and the judiciary set sentencing guidelines that provide outer limits of penalties to be followed by judges (see e.g., Ashworth, 2010, for details on setting sentencing guidelines). A judge should be required to provide reasons if he/she assigns penalties that deviate significantly from the guideline.
Conclusion
It is argued that limiting the powers of judges may result in injustice to the poor relative to the rich if the punishment involves a fixed cash payment for a given level of crime. On the other hand, granting unlimited discretion powers to the judiciary such as the case in Ghana could result in 18 corruption. Data on theft cases prosecuted in Ghana within the period of 2005-2010 was used to verify the hypothesis that discretions could result in corruption.
The result from a Suits-type index indicates a severely regressive punishment structure.
Thus petty thieves are harshly punished while their counterparts who steal more are highly favored.
Furthermore investigations reveal that the petty thieves are made up of the unemployed, farmers, and teachers who belong to the lower strata of the social scale. On the other hand, those who had more money to steal are a politician, a banker, and a businessman who are elites in society. In addition, from a regression analysis, it has been found that convicts who engaged in robbery received more jail time on the average than their counterparts who engage in other forms of theft.
These results are indicative of the fact that the current judicial system in Ghana favors blue and white color crimes. To address this problem, sentencing guidelines are needed.
Moreover, it has also been found that criminals convicted in the Ashanti region (where most cases where convicted) received lengthier jail time than those convicted in other regions.
